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Regionalism and Developing Countries: A Primer† 
 
 
April 2005 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper discusses regionalism from the standpoint of 
developing countries surveying the more significant recent 
contributions surrounding the contentious debate about 
identifying resulting benefits for Southern partners in the 
recent wave of North-South Preferential Trading Agreements 
(PTAs). The primer starts with an assessment of efficiency 
effects of PTAs with a focus on the consequences of partner 
choice, then moves on to non-traditional aspects of 
regionalism. Implementation issues deal with the extent of 
integration and the implications of rules of origin for the 
extent of market access. Finally, the political economy of 
trade policy decisions in a regional environment, and the 
politics of regional agreements. 
 
JEL: F11, F15,  
Keywords: regional integration, trade creation, trade 
diversion, political economy
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Céline Carrère, Riccardo Faini, Mark Melatos, Marcelo Olarreaga, Alberto 
Portugal-Perez, Maurice Schiff, Nicolas Schmitt and Alan Winters for 
comments on an earlier draft. 
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Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs henceforth synonymous 
with preferential i.e. discriminatory arrangements) are 
rising and, for many observers, have become the most 
promising route to market integration, in particular for 
developing economies which are the focus of this paper (see 
figure 1). According to a recent tally [World Bank (2005), 
table 2.1], the average number of RTAs per country is 6, 
with 45 developing countries having signed bilateral trading 
arrangements with a Northern partner, and of the 109 North-
South (N-S) PTAs, 90 having been created since 1990.  At 
issue is whether the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) which 
replaces gunboat diplomacy by a rules-based system and a 
dispute-settlement procedure is working well for developing 
countries. Also at issue is how much market access Southern 
partners get from the Northern partner. A huge literature on 
regionalism and development has spawned, and this paper is a 
selective review (hence ‘a primer’) of that literature 
asking what the developing countries can expect to obtain 
from preferential market access rather than relying on 
multilateralism.  
 
Figure 1 here: The proliferation of RTAs 
 
If the MTS works as it is supposed to, primary beneficiaries 
are the developing countries, so anything that weakens it 
should be considered very carefully from their perspective. 
In other words, whether or not RTAs represent building blocs 
is a more important issue for countries with little 
bargaining power than for the US or the EU. With some South-
South (S-S) exceptions, the majority of RTAs are of the N-S 
variety. Yet, with lopsided bargaining power, there is 
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concern that developing countries are not gaining much 
market access. Given the risks of an unraveling of the MTS, 
it is necessary to examine carefully the benefits conferred 
to developing countries by the current wave of RTAs.  
 
In addition, to the three basic principles of the MTS 
enshrined in the WTO,1 the dispute settlement understanding 
supposedly establishes a credible mechanism to resolve 
disputes. Nonetheless, evidence is accumulating that the 
dispute settlement process under the WTO is not redressing 
the pattern of GATT-inconsistent activity that took place 
under the GATT, activity that was largely targeted against 
bilaterally powerless countries (Bown (2004)).2     
 
An RTA, which is almost always built around discriminatory 
preferential trade policy, is in direct contradiction with 
the spirit of Article I.  Article XXIV, however, opens the 
door for exceptions, provided that substantially all trade 
barriers are removed, and that the partners do not raise 
their protection towards non-members. Furthermore, the MTS 
is supposed to be ‘favorable’ to the developing countries by 
                     
1 The three basic principles of the MTS enshrined in the WTO are: non-
discrimination, known as the most-favored-nation or MFN clause (in 
article I)); national treatment (article III); transparent and 
foreseeable bound tariffs as the only instruments of protection (article 
XI), and; participation of all members by reciprocity to avoid the free-
riding inherent in the MFN clause (article XXVIII). Reciprocity also 
limits terms-of-trade motivations since reduced protection at home and 
abroad leave terms-of-trade roughly unchanged and it also helps overcome 
internal political pressures since losses in import-competing sectors 
are offset by gains in exporting sectors. 
2 After controlling for market access interests, Bown (2005) shows that 
the determinants of participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement between 
1995 and 2000 continues to display an “institutional bias”: under 
current rules developing countries with little power of retaliation or 
capacity to absorb substantial legal costs do not participate in the 
litigation. Neither do countries participate if they are particularly 
reliant on bilateral assistance from the respondent or are engaged in a 
PTA with the respondent. 
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granting them special and differential treatment, which in 
the case of RTAs means that South-South RTAs can be carried 
out under the so-called enabling clause which gives full 
leeway in the extent of reduction in trade barriers.3  
 
This primer examines the implications of regionalism from 
the perspective of developing countries. Section 1 provides 
some background that sets up the issues. Section 2 turns to 
what we have learnt about the efficiency effects of RTAs. 
Section 3 turns to implementation (depth of integration and 
rules of origin). Section 4 deals with politics and 
political economy. Section 5 concludes with recommendations 
that would make regionalism more supportive of 
multilateralism. 
 
1. Background, controversies and historical perspective 
 
During the sixties, RTAs were either of the S-S type (with 
an objective of industrialization by import substitution) or 
of the N-N type (EFTA and the European Common market) 
involving deeper integration, because it was essentially a 
political endeavor. The second wave starting in the early 
nineties involved primarily N-S RTAs like the several  
enlargements of the EU and the EU relations with developing 
countries (the EU has some form of PTA with all but 10 of 
                     
3 Sometimes, a distinction is made between non-discriminatory 
arrangements (policy cooperation at the regional level) and 
discriminatory (or preferential trading arrangements—PTAs). Regional 
cooperation agreements often serve to coordinate policies (e.g. sharing 
power networks, building basic infrastructure). They are non 
controversial since, in principle, they provide some benefits to all 
participants without harming non-participants (internalization of 
externalities and no negative spillovers). Since almost all regional 
integration arrangements (RIAs) are discriminatory, we do not consider 
this non-controversial type of arrangement further. 
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its trading partners (Sapir (1998))), or in the case of the 
US, NAFTA the several bilateral FTAs (with Chile, Jordan, 
Poland, etc…). The most notable exception was MERCOSUR, 
representing a case of substantial integrations---a customs 
Union (CU) among developing countries.  
 
Why then is regionalism so contentious? First, in spite of 
the fact that reducing trade barriers is a move in the 
direction of reducing barriers to trade and hence 
distortions in the allocation of resources across countries, 
the basic economics of discriminatory reduction in trade 
barriers is ambiguous for participating members. Second, it 
is difficult to ascertain what trade policy the member 
countries would have followed if they had not chosen a 
preferential approach to trade policy (e.g. what 
agricultural policy would have emerged in Europe in the 
absence of RTAs). Third, today RTAs are widespread (usually 
FTAs) and the negotiating agenda goes beyond commercial 
preferences (i.e. involves some form of ‘deep integration’ 
which is hard to quantify).4 Fourth, with the spread of RTAs 
(see figure 1), regionalism may diminish the incentives to 
participate in future multilateral trade negotiations as 
countries perceive they have sufficient market access, and 
do not want to expose themselves to increased competitive 
pressures from non-members. Fifth, concern has been 
expressed that if the world gets divided in a few large 
trading blocs, the probability of trade conflicts would 
increase as each country exploits its market power (Krugman 
                     
4 Because of multiple memberships, it is difficult to evaluate 
implementation costs. Indeed, some countries find themselves 
simultaneously engaged in a CU partnership (which involves a common 
trade policy) while at the same time participating in an FTA with 
another set of partners.  
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(1991)). Developing countries, with little negotiating power 
would then be the main losers of the consequences of 
widespread regionalism.   
 
The relation between regionalism and multilateralism will 
not be pursued further here,5 beyond noting that the 
tendency for countries to seek privileged trade partnerships 
with (usually neighboring) countries has been widespread 
throughout history. A prominent example is the near free-
trade status enjoyed by the world trading system in the 
latter part of the 19th Century which was the result of a 
‘domino’ effect following the Anglo-French establishment of 
a FTA (the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1863) which set into 
motion a series of bilateral treaties between France and its 
major trading partners who did not want to be left out in 
the cold following the market access gained by the British.6 
So 19th Century regionalism was the mechanism by which goods 
markets were integrated around the world suggesting that 
PTAs could be a stepping stone towards a world-wide move to 
free trade. In the 19th Century, the widespread application 
of the unconditional MFN clause (much like in the present-
day MTS under the aegis of the WTO), was through the 
application of bilateral treaties. At the same time, while 
the WTS enjoyed quasi free-trade status, unlike today’s 
system then, as noted by Irwin (1993), there were no limits 
equivalent to today’s tariff bindings for WTO members, which 
                     
5 For early views, see the contributions in de Melo and Panagariya eds. 
(1993). For later comprehensive reviews see World Bank (2000, chp. 7) 
Schiff and Winters (2003, chp. 8) and World Bank (2005, chp. 6). 
6 This domino view of regionalism has been put forth recently in 
evaluating the expansion in membership in the EU (Baldwin 1997). 
Basically, as the EU enlarged, non-participating firms saw their demand 
shrink, leading them to lower their price-cost margins, lowering profits 
and from there to lobbying efforts at membership participation.   
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could have prevented the surge of protectionism that 
occurred in the early part of the 20th Century.  
 
Since it is a safe bet to assume that regionalism is here to 
stay, in my focus on developing countries’ interests, I pay 
particular attention to the choice of partner, i.e. are 
North-South RTAs (the majority among recent agreements) 
preferable to S-S from the perspective of what do RTAs bring 
to developing countries that they cannot obtain from the 
WTO, and is this costly? 
 
2. Efficiency Effects of PTAs 
 
2.1 Trade creation and trade diversion7  
Since tariffs are still non-negligible for developing 
countries, it is sensible to start with the efficiency or 
welfare effects of PTAs. Efficiency effects are analyzed 
using the notions of ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ 
(see the annex for a definition and a numerical example 
illustrating the welfare for country A of engaging in an FTA 
with country B). 
 
Applying these concepts to RTAs involving developing 
countries suggests four comments. First, in the case of 
trade diversion (here DVDs in table A1), note that if the 
difference in unit costs between B and C exceeded the tariff 
imposed by A on DVDs (here 20%), nothing would happen since 
C would continue to the low-cost supplier in A. This 
                     
7 The seminal contributions are collected in the readings edited 
Bhagwati et al. (1999), and exhaustively surveyed in Panagariya (2000).  
Being a primer rather than a survey, the paper keeps citations to a 
minimum and generally to the more recent contributions. Schiff and 
Winters (2003) and World Bank (2005) have extensive bibliographies. 
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situation, coupled with the small reduction in tariffs 
prevalent in many S-S RTAs of the first generation, explains 
why trade among partners often did not increase 
significantly following the implementation of the PTA. 
Second, if the partner B cannot flood A’s market (i.e. if it 
supplies DVDs at increasing marginal costs)--again a case 
prevalent for many S-S PTAs, especially among small 
countries--then the price of DVDs will not fall in A since 
it will continue importing from C.  In this case, A’s 
welfare will unambiguously fall because it is losing tariff 
revenue to B (in effect it is subsidizing inefficient 
partner producers), while B’s gain will be less than A’s 
loss. As a result, overall welfare (here the combined 
effects on A’s and B’s welfare since the welfare of C is 
unaffected) will fall.  Third, note that in the case of a N-
S FTA (typical of second wave RTAs), A’s partner will 
typically be the EU or the US. Then, when there is trade 
diversion, the welfare-reducing effect coming from 
subsidizing the higher-cost partner B is likely to be small 
since the partner will often be close to the low-cost 
supplier on a world-wide basis.  
 
2.2 Quantifying costs and benefits 
The evaluation of the welfare effects of FTAs and CUs are 
either carried out ex-ante on the basis of simulation 
methods or ex-post on the basis of an analysis of the 
evolution of intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade shares.8 
                     
8 Ex-ante simulation methods give orders of magnitude of the welfare 
effects under alternative assumptions about market structure and 
elasticities. Unfortunately, the elastiticies needed for the evaluation 
are rarely estimated and the behavioral assumptions in the models are 
not confronted with the data. Ex-post methods rely on a detailed 
analysis of observed trade flows, and usually do not infer welfare 
effects. This latter approach is confronted with two problems: (a) 
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Ex-ante estimates.  In addition to capturing the efficiency 
effects operating under the perfect competition case 
discussed above (and illustrated in the annex), simulation 
models also include the following effects of trade policy 
changes for industries operating under imperfect 
competition: (i) pro-competitive effects coming from a 
reduction in protection which forces firms to lower their 
mark-up over costs as they face a more elastic demand for 
their products; (ii) scale efficiency effects whereby firms 
operating at less than minimum efficient scale may move up 
or down their average cost curve leading to scale efficiency 
effects; (iii) entry/exit effects; (iv) variety-related 
welfare effects (trade liberalization increases varieties 
offered to consumers and varieties of intermediate inputs 
for producers).  
  
These simulation exercises highlight the relative importance 
of the following effects. First, if the elimination of 
protection favors, on average, industries with increasing 
returns to scale, all else equal, an FTA is likely to be 
welfare-enhancing. Second, for small developing economies 
engaged in a S-S FTA, the gains from market access to the 
protected partner’s market is not likely to compensate for 
the trade diversion effects of switching to the less 
efficient partner. Third, unilateral trade liberalization is 
always superior to an equivalent trade liberalization on a 
discriminatory basis. As a corollary, additive regionalism 
                                                             
considering what trade policies countries would have followed in the 
absence of the FTA (typically the assumption is one of no change in 
trade policy); (b) do the observed changes in trade flows attributed to 
an FTA in fact represent the effect of some omitted variables was 
correlated with a variable included in the model.  
 
 10
is always preferable to single-partner regionalism for the 
country that engages in it.9 
 
Ex-post estimates. Trade intensity and import propensity 
calculations for the major recent FTAs reveal the mixed 
patterns (under the counterfactual assumption that in the 
absence of the FTA, trade would have increased pari passu 
across partners). In some cases (e.g. MERCOSUR, UDEAC, GCC) 
increases in openness were reflected in rising import shares 
in GDP and trade intensity for partners and non-partners 
alike; in others (e.g. CACM II, CARICOM, AFTA), intra-bloc 
import propensities declined. As a result, the recent 
experience reveals no general patterns. 
 
A preferred approach to building the counterfactual is to 
estimate an econometric model predicting the intensity of 
trade in terms of country size, transport costs between 
partners, and other variables (common border, common 
language, landlockedness), and then augment this model by 
dummy variables to capture the effects of RTAs. Known as the 
gravity model, this approach is currently the preferred one 
to estimate the sought-after Trade Creation and Trade 
Diversion effects.  
 
For many well-established RTAs like the EU, MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA (but also for some S-S RTAs), recent gravity-based 
                     
9 For example, Chile is engaged in 12 trade agreements. Simulations (see 
Schiff and Winters 2003, figure 3.2) show that Chile gains successively 
more as it enters NAFTA, NAFTA + MERCOSUR, and then NAFTA+ MERCOSUR+ an 
FTA with the EU. Of course, for partners that engaged in an FTA with 
Chile to get a preferential market access of 11 percent (Chile’s uniform 
tariff) saw this additive regionalism with a different eye, as their 
preferential access was being eroded. Implementation issues will be 
considered later. Harrison et al. (2003) review the lessons from these 
simulation models. 
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estimates show that the RTAs usually resulted in intra-
regional trade flows beyond those predicted by the gravity 
model (i.e those that would have prevailed in the absence of 
the RTA), often coupled with a reduction in imports from the 
rest-of-the-world, and at times coupled with a reduction in 
exports to the rest-of-the-world. Overall, this suggests 
evidence of trade diversion.  As an example of a recent 
study, consider the evolution of the estimated trend in the 
dummy variables for intra-regional trade, exports and 
imports to and from the rest-of-the-world in figure 2 below. 
For both MERCOSUR and NAFTA, one notices a rather 
significant increase in intra-regional trade accompanied by 
a decline in trade with the rest-of-the-world around the 
time of the implementation of the RTA.10    
 
Figure 2 here: Gravity panel estimates 
 
In the efficiency effects identified so far, there is 
nothing that suggests the superiority of a preferential 
approach to trade policy over a non-discriminatory one, and 
one could conclude that there is not much, if any, overall 
sense of trade creation, even if it appears that the N-S 
RTAs of the second wave are preferable to the earlier S-S 
RTAs. Are there other efficiency effects that could overturn 
these conclusions?  
 
Some claim that because typically RTAs are formed between 
neighboring countries (sometimes described as ‘natural 
                     
10 Trade diversion can also occur under non-discriminatory reduction in 
protection if tariff reduction increases the effective rate of 
protection. Among other recent studies of the efficiency effects of 
RTAs, Krishna (2003) finds that trade creation dominates trade diversion 
in 80% of the cases, while Yeats (1998) finds evidence of trade 
diversion for MERCOSUR.  
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trading partners’ to reflect large trade flows), this 
justifies their existence. A large trade flow, however, does 
not mean that it should be stimulated, indeed if might be 
large in the first place because of a distortion. Others 
have argued that preferences should be extended to neighbors 
because it would economize on transport costs. While this 
may be defended, especially if there are important economies 
of scale in transport involving irreversible investments11, 
there is no evidence so far of any correlation between 
geographic proximity or the volume of trade and the welfare 
effects of reductions in preferential tariffs (Krishna 
(2003)). 
 
Finally, there is concern that trade liberalization which 
modifies the interactions between the forces of 
agglomeration (centripetal forces associated with labor 
pooling, knowledge spillovers and forward/backward linkages) 
and dispersion (transport costs and other barriers to trade, 
and congestion effects) might lead to de-industrialization 
in the South. Does this justify preferential S-S 
partnerships? So far, as in the case of economies of scale 
in transport, convincing evidence is still lacking. However, 
illustrative simulations in a three-country world in which 
two small Southern countries can reduce protection either 
multilaterally or bilaterally (either with a large Northern 
country or with a small Southern neighbor) suggest that a N-
S partnership is likely to offer better prospects than a S-S 
partnership because of better overall net market access. 
                     
11 Freund (2000) develops a simple model with economies of scale in 
transport involving sunk costs. She shows that if non-members reach a 
lower welfare level, members reach a higher welfare level under 
regionalism than under multilateralism. Hummels and Skiba (2004) give 
some evidence of economies of scale for transport in Latin America. 
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However, for each Southern partner, multilateral 
liberalization is less desirable because of competition in 
the Northern country is stiffer when the other Southern 
country also has market access (Puga and Venables (1998)).    
 
The superiority of N-S agreements on efficiency grounds also 
holds when one views trade as largely driven by comparative 
advantage effects where countries exports the services of 
their abundant factors: (labor for the South and capital for 
the North). Suppose then that the world consists of 
countries that either have a capital-labor endowment above 
the world average (Northern countries) or below average 
(Southern countries). An FTA between two Northern [e.g. 
Switzerland and Hungary] (Southern) [e.g. Kenya and Uganda] 
countries is likely to lead to income convergence 
(divergence) as the richest [Switzerland] (poorest) [Uganda] 
partner is engaging in a less efficient trade pattern as a 
result of preferences to his partner. For partnerships 
between very rich and very poor countries, it is likely that 
the Southern partner will gain, though this is unlikely for 
partners close to the world average (Venables, 2003). 
 
 
3. Implementation 
 
Implementing an RTA always involves some form of policy 
coordination. This coordination may take place over so-
called ‘behind-the-border’ measures that are an obstacle to 
trade.12 Then regionalism allows countries to go into deeper 
                     
12 ‘Behind-the-border’ barriers to trade result from segmented labor 
markets, lack of coordination among regulatory institutions, and lack of 
 14
market integration than under multilateralism. But 
implementation also involves rules of origin when 
integration is less than a CU, and bargaining over a common 
external tariff under a CU.   
 
3.1. Integration of domestic policies  
Most RTAs have on their agenda some form of policy 
integration going from the least demanding (coordination on 
an ad-hoc basis) to harmonization of national standards and 
regulation (often driven by market size effects) up to 
recognition of foreign regulatory regimes and assessment 
procedures by Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). So far, 
only the EU has used MRAs, and the process has taken 30 
years to reach this relatively advanced stage of policy 
integration and delegation of authority to supranational 
institutions. Again, much of the benefits from policy 
integration such as reduction in red tape, harmonization of 
standards to international norms could be carried out on a 
non-discriminatory basis.  
 
However, there is a fundamental difference with 
discriminatory trade liberalization: unlike for tariff 
preferences that lead to rents, reductions in transactions 
costs only involve increases in efficiency. As such, they 
will always lead to an improvement in efficiency, at least 
in a competitive environment, thereby avoiding the ambiguity 
associated with preferential reduction in goods which 
involve rents. Moreover, efficiency gains are likely to be 
significant, since reductions in trade transaction costs 
(border formalities, standards certification, frictional or 
                                                             
harmonization on standards. See World Bank (2005, chp. 4) for further 
discussion.  
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red tape costs) give rise to large efficiency gains 
(rectangles that represent rents in welfare calculations now 
also reflect efficiency gains that are added to the 
efficiency triangles associated with tariffs reductions). 
Because cooperation on policy requires trust that takes long 
time to build (to delegate authority in decision-making), no 
RTA has made much progress on cooperation for standards 
beyond WTO rules.   
 
Significant gains along the same lines would also apply from 
preferential liberalization in services and public 
procurement. For services, the scope for efficiency gains 
via increased competition could be very large.13 Yet, even 
though a services component is often included in RTAs, with 
the exception of NAFTA, little progress has been made. 
Likewise, RTAs have made little progress on public 
procurement policies (the EU and NAFTA provide for the 
application of the national treatment rule).14 Apart from 
the EU, NAFTA is the only instance of ‘deep’ integration 
beyond what might be achieved multilaterally since it 
includes for national treatment in establishment, MFN 
treatment in establishment and operation, a ban on 
performance requirements and a phase out on old ones, as 
                     
13 Much like the enabling cause allows S-S RTAs to be exempt from the 
economically sound constraints of article XXIV (not all trade must be 
covered, NTBs can be used, and tariff reductions can be reduced as 
wished) GATTS article V (which is closely modeled on Article XXIV) also 
gives greater flexibility for S-S agreements. Fink and Matoo (2002) 
discuss the distinctions (mostly relating to market structure) that must 
be taken into account when discussing the effects of RTAs in services. 
14 However, this might be expected as governments may buy products 
locally either because they are non-tradable or because of asymmetric 
information that would require monitoring of suppliers calling for 
geographic proximity. 
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well as extensive dispute settlement provisions that allow 
private action against governments.15 
 
The NAFTA example brings about the potential policy 
credibility enhancing effects in N-S RTAs for Southern 
partners.16 Even though RTA treaties do not include 
macroeconomic and general domestic constraints, it is 
generally agreed that in the case of NAFTA, Mexican 
negotiators were far more interested in using NAFTA to lock-
in ongoing domestic policy reforms than in exchanging 
concessions.  
 
Are credibility benefits likely to be widespread in other N-
S RTAs? This is particularly important for African countries 
(and former European colonies—known as the ACP (for African, 
Caribbean and Pacific), now engaged in negotiations for 
Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs) with the EU on a 
fully reciprocal basis (the former Lomé conventions now WTO-
inconsistent amounted to non-reciprocal preferences). In the 
case of the EPAs, since tariffs are below bound levels at 
the WTO, one must ask whether the EU will want to play the 
role of agency of external restraint and prevent former 
colonies to raise temporarily tariffs for, say balance of 
payments purposes, following a crisis. Neither can one 
expect the EPAs to signal that ACPs will reduce their 
                     
15 In N-S FTAs, the Northern partner typically sets the agenda. US FTAs 
typically involve the most explicit negotiations for market access in 
services and US-style rules for investment and intellectual property, 
not to mention a level of labor protection resulting in labor laws that 
are more stringent than those that the Southern partner would adopt. 
Market access agreements for EU FTAs contain provision for Services, but 
tend to reinforce international rules for intellectual property. For 
details, see World Bank (2005, table 5.1).  
16 Fernandez and Portes (1998) were the first to discuss these so-called 
non-traditional aspects of RTAs. Also see Schiff and Winters (2003 chps. 
4 and 6) and World Bank (2005, chps. 4 and 5)  
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protection against third countries, since during the 
negotiations, ACPs have insisted on long adjustment periods 
and sought to obtain a waiver for Lomé arrangements (a 
waiver was obtained until 2008).  
 
Finally, the use of contingent protection such as anti-
dumping and countervailing duties could be banned in RTAs. 
Yet, the anti-dumping specter hangs over virtually all N-S 
RTAs (NAFTA, APEC, the EU-Turkey CU, and all other FTAs the 
EU is engaged in) not to mention S-S RTAs like MERCOSUR. So 
N-S RTAs have not given much reason for comfort for Southern 
countries in access to their partners’ markets. Prospects 
also look dim for the ongoing Free Trade of the Americas 
(FTAA) negotiations. 
 
A natural question that arises is whether deep regional 
integration can arise without an RTA (i.e. a purely 
cooperative agreement). Monetary unions, for example, have 
at times occurred in isolation as in the case of Panama, 
Ecuador and El Salvador who have adopted the dollar. But 
monetary unions have as an objective to enforce monetary 
stability rather than to facilitate trade (though this may 
be a positive side-effect), and does not involve concessions 
from all countries as in the case of agreements to 
facilitate trade. In agreements necessitating concessions 
from all countries, deeper integration has typically been 
achieved through trade agreements. 
 
In sum, lack of policy integration should not be a surprise 
since most RTAs have after all, a commercial objective 
rather than an economic union like the EU which has taken 
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the step to create the necessary supranational institutions 
with mandates to make policies in specific areas.   
 
3.2 Rules of Origin (RoO) 
Most RTAs are FTAs so that establishing origin is necessary 
to prevent trade deflection (imports entering into the area 
via the partner with the low tariff). At the same time, even 
with RoO, nothing prevents the low tariff partner from 
satisfying domestic consumption by imports and exporting all 
its production to the high tariff partner (called indirect 
trade deflection). RoO occupy 80 pages in the FTA agreement 
between the EU and Poland and no less than 200 for NAFTA. 
With countries simultaneously engaged in several (sometimes 
overlapping) RTAs, administering RoO adopted to identify 
origin (change of tariff classification, technical 
requirements and exceptions, various forms of regional 
content requirements) becomes complex and burdensome. While 
RoO are necessary, it is increasingly recognized that their 
complex design impose both economic costs beyond those 
needed to meet reasonable definitions of origin, and 
additional administrative costs associated with their 
complexity.17    
 
Because the rules for establishing origin are so complex, a 
recent (and growing) literature has sought to devise summary 
indices indicating the restrictiveness of the set of RoO and 
applied these indices at the tariff-line level. Table 1 
summarizes the restrictiveness of the product specfic rules 
of origin (PSRO) for the two main Northern countries 
instigators or FTAS with Southern partners: the EU and the 
                     
17 See Brenton and Imagawa (2004) and Cadot et al. eds (2005) for a 
compendium of contributions on various aspects of the costs of RoO.  
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US. Note that the PSRO are more restrictive for the highly 
protected sectors suggesting that market access for the 
Southern partner is, indeed, limited. 
 
Table 1 here: Product Specific Rules of Origin 
Restrictiveness Index and Protection  
 
As a result of these costs, it has been observed that in N-S 
preferential market access schemes such as the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP), utilization rates are often 
quite low, even in sectors where preferential access in the 
Northern partner is substantial (i.e. over 10% in textiles & 
clothing). Utilization rates under NAFTA status for Mexican 
exporters in 2001 (when they faced zero duties in US 
markets) was not particularly high (.e.g. 79% in textiles 
and clothing where the preferential access margin was 12%). 
Taking Mexican exporters under NAFTA as an example, it would 
appear that RoO in N-S FTAs are designed to give market 
access to inefficient US textile producers (intermediates 
goods) in Mexico thereby raising the costs of Mexican 
producers of clothing (Anson et al. 2005). 
 
Under those circumstances, one is tempted to conclude that 
RoO in N-S FTAs almost end up yielding no market access for 
the Southern partner, resulting in the Southern partner 
being just about left on its ‘participation constraint’. In 
sum, since RoO are not necessary under a full CU (that is a 
CU with both a CET and coordination on other trade 
policies), deeper commercial integration should be 
preferable to shallow integration. 
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4. Political Economy 
 
There is more to RTAs than elimination of trade barriers 
since the process of integration is likely to affect trade 
policy stance towards non-members, especially for developing 
countries which have tariff bindings at the WTO well above 
actual levels. For example, in the case of the MERCOSUR, a 
CET had to be negotiated. Usually, in such negotiations the 
bigger partner takes the lead with the result that the CET 
is closer to its prevailing tariff which is also usually 
higher because large countries often have higher protection. 
Politics also pay an important role in RTAs. We review both 
below.  
 
4.1 Lobbying Activities  
 
Whether integration brings a reduction in lobbying activity 
(a dilution effect if lobbies diminish their activities 
because of higher costs since they have to be active over a 
larger jurisdiction) or not will depend largely on the 
extent to which lobbies coordinate activities across 
countries. For example, in a S-S RTA among middle income 
countries, an initial lobbying game where agriculture and 
manufacturing lobbies cancel each other, could be 
transformed into a situation of cooperation among 
agricultural lobbies while manufacturing lobbies compete (as 
they produce the same things) so that a CU could lead to 
agricultural protection.18  
                     
18 Arrangements for supranational institutions under deep integration 
raises further the possibility of a bias towards a protectionist 
outcome. Two simple models of institutional failures show how this might 
occur. In the first, suppose that a country’s benefit from a policy is 
proportional to its share in production (e.g. via a production subsidy) 
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It is difficult to assess the importance of the dilution 
effect in an RTA. But examples of the results of lobbying 
activities in N-S and S-S RTAs show that the highly 
protected sectors usually obtain concessions resulting in 
trade diversion. This is not surprising since trade creation 
is a mixed blessing for a negotiating government because it 
generates surpluses for its consumers and for exporters in 
partner countries at the expense of profits in import-
competing industries where lobbies are the strongest 
(protection being a public good, free-riding will be less 
among producers than among consumers and least among 
producers in concentrated activities). Trade diversion, by 
contrast, avoids the reduction in profits, and may be 
preferable for governments if producer’s interests weigh 
more heavily in their objectives than consumer’s interests 
(whose gains will be less under trade diversion). 
      
Pushed to the extreme, suppose that negotiators care only 
about producers’ profits when they negotiate an RTA. Take 
again a three-country framework where producers are profit-
making oligopolists. Starting from a non-discriminatory 
trade policy, let A and B contemplate an FTA.  Will 
governments get the necessary support? Quite likely they 
                                                             
while its costs are proportional to its share in consumption GDP. In a 
CU where consensus is prized, countries deciding on a package of price 
increasing measures will end up adopting an all-encompassing package 
even, if, overall each country would preferred a no-subsidy policy 
outcome. (This is known as the ‘restaurant bill’ problem in reference to 
behavior in restaurants when the bill is split equal among hosts.) The 
second, known as universalism, is the situation where the share of the 
spoils are concentrated while the costs (which exceed the benefits 
because of the inefficiency of protection) are split evenly. Then, each 
government’s negotiation position is best summarized in the statement: “ 
we are opposed in principle to this measure, but if it passes, we want a 
share of the spoils”.  See Schiff and Winters (2003, box 3.2). 
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will because while producers might lose market share (and 
hence profits) to each other, they may well gain more market 
share and profits at the expense of C so that they will 
support an FTA because their profits would go up. By the 
same reasoning, producers would be less likely to support 
participation in subsequent multilateral negotiations 
because this would essentially involve giving up market 
share and profits to C (Krishna (1998)). 19 
  
4.2 The Politics of RIAs.  
For policy-makers, and certainly for politicians, there is 
more to regional integration than economics. Reflecting on 
the relative role of economics and politics, Walter 
Hallstein, president of the European Commission said: “We’re 
not in business at all; we’re in politics”. Political 
scientists have concluded that the use of trade diplomacy in 
a regional context, and especially deeper integration like 
the EU, might assist political relations leading to lesser 
conflict. Preferential trading relations among neighboring 
countries (those that are most likely to enter into armed 
conflict) requiring more contacts would then diffuse 
tensions. Obvious in the case of tensions between France and 
Germany in the EU, tension diffusion between Argentina and 
Brazil under military rivalry was also an important 
objective for MERCOSUR. 
 
But trade integration can also increase tensions, especially 
when it involves large transfers between unequal partners, 
                     
19 Using data for 50 coutries, Foroutan (1998) both integrating and non-
integrating countries have reduced their trade barriers so that 
regionalism would, so far at least, be benign. Estevadeordal and 
Robertson (2004) also find that  MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs 
have been falling in tandem in Latin America over the period 1985-97. 
 23
as for example in the case of the East African Community 
(EAC), where the dominating country Kenya, was benefiting 
both from agglomeration effects in industry and from large 
income transfers from lost tariff revenue by Tanzania and 
Uganda. The EAC was closed in 1978, and the resulting 
atmosphere of hostility contributed to conflict between 
Tanzania and Uganda in 1979. 
 
The EAC example also indicates the importance of lump-sum 
(i.e. non-distortionary transfers) from the rich to the poor 
partners when per capita and economic differences between 
partners are large (a commonplace among many S-S RIAs in 
Africa). Unfortunately, unlike the second enlargement of the 
EU where such transfers were available for the new entrants, 
for low-income countries, such resources are not available 
even among the richer members. This aspect too, points to 
the superiority of N-S RIAs for even if transfers are non-
existent, at least they avoid the path taken by many first-
wave S-S RTAs where partial compensation was accomplished by 
distortionary policies which exacerbated the already strong 
trade diverting effects of the RIA. 
 
From a long list of political motives for regionalism, three 
deserve mention. The MERCOSUR protocol made democracy a pre-
condition for membership with consultation procedures in the 
case of violations. Helping restore or strengthen democratic 
rule was also implicit on the EU’s Southern and Eastern 
enlargements. Respect of democracy and human rights also 
figure in the current regional EPAs negotiated with ACP 
countries, though in this case, the credibility of 
enforcement mechanisms may be doubted because of lack of 
proximity and former colonial ties. Second for small 
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countries engaged in an RTA that delegate authority at the 
regional level, such as the CARICOM members, there are cost 
savings from the pooling of resources, and the negotiation 
position with the outside world are is strengthened. Third, 
some RTAs are also formed to deal with outside threats and 
regional hegemons (the GCC was partly formed in response to 
threats from Iran and Iraq, ASEAN in response to perceived 
threats from communism and the SADDC was formed in 1980 to 
provide a united front against apartheid South Africa). 
 
Political motives are also present for rich countries 
engaged in N-S RTAs. For rich country members in N-S RTAs, 
these are viewed as a means to stem the increasing migratory 
pressures, often perceived as threatening social stability. 
This was quite evident in the NAFTA negotiations when 
President Salinas said that NAFTA would help Mexico export 
more goods and fewer people. Similar concerns were expressed 
in the EU’s FTA negotiations with East European countries. 
Recent research and observations, however, casts doubt on 
this view that trade integration and immigration are 
substitutes, suggesting instead that they may be complements 
so that an RTA could increase migratory pressures. First, by 
raising incomes of the poorest families who are the most 
promote to emigrate, trade liberalization may increase 
migratory pressures. Second, more information about the 
destination country for migrants reduces migration costs. 
Third, a N-S RIA may not benefit unskilled workers, as for 
instance in the case of NAFTA, where unskilled workers saw a 
decline in their real incomes of 10 to 15 percent between 
the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
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Regional integration in the form of discriminatory trade 
preferences is controversial justifying the often-heard 
remark that a well-functioning WTS with low levels of 
protection relying heavily on non-discrimination and 
transparency would protect best the interests of developing 
countries. If the politics and political-economy aspects of 
RTAs show why they are so popular, efficiency considerations 
show that the biggest share of the gains from trade 
liberalization comes from dismantling domestic protection. 
Neglecting systemic issues, this means that the ideal trade 
policy for a developing country would then be unilateralism 
first, followed by multilateralism in second (when political 
constraints limit the extent of own liberalization 
reciprocity is effective in further liberalization), with 
regionalism in third place. Unfortunately for developing 
countries, led by the EU and the US, most countries are 
following exactly the reverse strategy, a trend that is only 
likely to be reversed if the Doha Round is successful.   
 
This primer also suggests that, with regionalism here to 
stay, developing countries are likely to be best served by 
partnerships with Northern countries, even though this means 
in the end little market access both because of falling 
protection worldwide and because of stiff RoO and because 
the industrialized countries will be setting the agenda for 
‘deep’ integration. At the same time, to minimize the losses 
associated with trade diversion, they should maintain low 
protection towards non-partners. In general, deep 
integration agreements which extend beyond reduction in 
trade barriers to include services and cooperation on 
‘behind-the-border’ measures should be encouraged because 
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reduction of technical barriers to trade avoid the ambiguity 
of reducing rent-ridden measures such as tariffs. Thus, if 
an exchange of concession at the regional level can take 
place to remove ‘behind-the-border’ measures, the resulting 
deep integration would enhance trade and welfare without the 
traditional costs of discriminatory RTAs.  
 
Finally, rules at the WTO could be modified to make 
regionalism more supportive of multilateralism. First, the 
leniency of the Enabling Clause which allows FTAs that are 
not all-inclusive could be tightened. Second, the WTO forum 
should be used to enforce simple and uniform rules-of-origin 
across product categories and especially across RTAs. Third, 
when RTAs are implemented among WTO members, they could be 
required to eliminate the gap between bound and applied 
tariff rates, thereby forcing members to commitment to 
multilateralism and free trade. Fourth, given the limited 
amount of WTO resources, monitoring RTAs should be avoided 
and the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should 
strive to focus on devising rules that are more likely to be 
welfare improving.      
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Annex: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
 
The following example illustrates these two concepts. 
Countries A and B consider forming an FTA, with the rest-of-
the-world represented by C. The focus is on the welfare 
effects for A from eliminating its 20% tariff on imports 
from its partner B. Arrows in table 1 indicate the source of 
import supply in A under the two trade policies: a non-
discriminatory tariff of 20% and a tariff applied only to 
imports from C. 
  
Table A1: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
  B A C  
 c0 11 13 10  
DVDs c0(1+t0) 13.2 13 ← 12  
 C0(1+t1) 11 → 13 12 Trade diversion 
      
 C0 18 15 20 Neither trade  
Textiles C0(1+t0) 21.6 15 24 Creation nor 
 C0(1+t1) 18 15 24 trade diversion 
      
 C0 15 17 16  
Shoes C0(1+t0) 18 17 19.2  
 C0(1+t1) 15→ 17 19.2 Trade creation 
      
Notes: 
c0 = unit cost 
t0 = A’s tariff before the FTA (t0C = t0B = 20%) 
t1 = A’s tariff after FTA with B (t0C = 20%; t0B =0%) 
 
For DVDs, the FTA results in a shift of supply away from the 
low-cost outside partner. This is called trade diversion. 
Trade diversion always results in some welfare loss because 
of lower tariff revenues for A (a transfer of rents to the 
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inefficient partner B). In the constant cost supply case 
illustrated here, the price for consumers in A is also 
lower. This effect is a source of welfare gain for A. In 
this case, the net welfare effect on A is ambiguous: on the 
one hand, it goes up because DVDs sell in A at a price 
closer to their opportunity cost of 10 in C, while on the 
other hand A loses tariff revenue to DVD producers in B who 
are in effect subsidized by consumers in A. 
 
For textiles, since A is the low-cost supplier, the FTA has 
no welfare effect.  
 
For shoes, B is the low-cost supplier. The FTA leads to a 
welfare gain since supply is always from the low-cost 
partner (in effect it is as if A had reduced its tariff in a 
non-discriminatory way). In fact there is both a transfer of 
government revenue from the government in A to its consumers 
(of no welfare consequence), and a reduction in price for 
consumers which is a source of welfare gain. 
 
Two caveats. First, in the numerical example in table A1, 
products are assumed to be homogenous, while in practice 
products are typically differentiated. Then A will import 
both from B and C before and after the FTA.20 Differentiated 
goods makes gains from an FTA more likely, as the price of 
the variety supplied by the partner will have to fall, while 
at the same time, the link between tariff reduction and 
price reduction (the source of welfare gain) is weakened so 
the magnitude  of the gains and losses are reduced. Second, 
                     
20 For example, in the case of NAFTA, in 1991 before NAFTA was a real 
possibility, 70 percent of Mexico’s imports came from the US (614 out of 
4854 headings) while in 1996, 78 percent of imports came from the US 
(296 out of 4854 headings). 
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no spillovers are assumed to occur. Recent evidence (Chang 
and Winters (2002), however, suggests that non-partners see 
their terms-of-trade deteriorate following the formation of 
an FTA or CU. In this case, the above results would need to 
be modified, with the possibility of gains from an RTA not 
available in the case of non-discriminatory trade 
liberalization. 
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Table 1 
 Product Specific Rules of Origin Restrictiveness Index and 
Protection  
 
Index valuea,b   
  NAFTA PANEURO 
Tariff peaksc 6.2(257) 4.20(3595) 
Low tariffsd 4.8(1432) 3.41(6092) 
Total number of 
tariff lines 3555 19720 
 
Notes: A higher value of the index means a more restrictive 
RoO  
a,b. The index takes a value ranging from 1 (least 
restrictive) to 7 (most restrictive). 
c. Tariffs that are three times above the mean. 
d. Tariffs that are less than one third of the mean. 
 
Source: Cadot et al. 2005, table 3. 
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Figure 1: The Proliferation of RTAs 
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Source: [World Bank (2005), figure 2.1] 
 
 
Figure 2: Panel Gravity estimates 
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